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e Egyptian Islamic Group’s Critique of Al-Qaeda’s Interpretation 
of Jihad 
by Paul Kamolnick
[T]here is a diﬀerence in views between two visions of jihad. e vision of the Islamic Group 
and the vision of Al-Qa’ida. . . [ey] . . . called for a jihad that puts the logic of challenge above 
the principle of calculations, the preservation of interests, the availability of capabilities, and the 
perception of the goals. --Isam Dirbalah [1]
eir[Al-Qa’ida’s] aim is jihad, and our aim is Islam – Najih Ibrahim [2]
Abstract
A speci$c branch of Islamic jurisprudence ($qh al-jihad) regulates the waging of the jihad of the 
sword (jihad bis saif). In this article, a detailed exposition is presented of the Egyptian Islamic 
Group’s (IG; Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya) use of $qh al jihad against Al-Qaeda. e present author’s 
‘jihad-realist’ approach is $rst brie%y described; the IG’s critique of AQ systematically outlined; 
and in conclusion, implications are derived for counter-radicalisation strategies.
Introduction
Intra-Islamist legal critiques of Al-Qaeda (AQ) should be carefully scrutinized for their 
potential value in countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ’s global terrorism. e 
present article extends the author’s previous research in two directions. [3] First, rather than 
providing detailed shari’a proofs its primary focus is craing a more generalized, strategically 
useful conceptual framework contrasting legitimate and illegitimate jihad. Second, it 
reintroduces and illustrates the potential strategic potential of the generally neglected research 
on shari’a produced by the Egyptian Islamic Group (IG; Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya) which 
delegitimises unlawful jihad. e article is organized as follows. e present author’s ‘jihad-
realist’ approach is #rst brie&y described. e IG’s ‘Corrective Concepts Series’ (Silsilat Tahih 
al-Mafahim) is then analyzed with speci#c attention to its carefully rendered contrast between 
two visions of jihad, one rooted in mainstream Sunni jurisprudence and the other one alleging 
a deviation from such. In a #nal section, conclusions are presented and brief implications 
deduced for a counterterrorist messaging strategy.
A Jihad-Realist Approach
e IG’s critique of AQ’s alleged violations of the lawful jihad presumes that ‘jihad of the 
sword’ (jihad bis saif), conceived defensively and oﬀensively, is an essential and enduring 
religious prescription binding on all observant and eligible Muslims. [4] e acceptance of this 
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jihad imperative therefore places the IG in the camp of those Islamists whose ultimate goal -a 
state ruled by shari’a, and societal norms steeped in Islamicity - is derived from the same 
Islamist textual universe as that of AQ. is presumptive religious prescription is key, 
ironically, to the IG’s critique of AQ’s mass casualty terrorist modus operandi. Why so? As an 
internal Islamist critique - one that relies on the same sala#st understandings of the sources of 
law and justi#cations for the militant expansion of the faith - should the IG prove that AQ is 
guilty of violating the jurisprudence regulating the jihad ($qh al-jihad), or causing great 
misfortune to the Islamic Call and broader umma (Islamic faith community), AQ’s status as 
‘sala#-jihadi’ vanguard is delegitimized. Let us now examine systematically, the IG’s case.
Correcting the Errors of Jihad: e Shari’a of Lawful Military Jihad (Fiqh al-Jihad)
e Corrective Concepts Series (Silsilat Tashih al-Mafahim)
e Corrective Concepts Series comprises approximately twenty independent publications 
[5] produced by the IG’s ‘historic leaders’[6]: the #ve original members Abd al-Rahman, 
Shaykh Salah Hashim, Karam Zuhdi, Usamah Ha#z, and Muhammad Shawqi al-Islambuli; it 
also includes three others who joined early-on, Najih Ibrahim (generally regarded as the 
group’s senior religious scholar and the one who contributed most to the Corrections), Asim 
Abd-al-Majid, and Isam Dirbalah. Each historic leader was either a senior author, co-author, 
or consultative reviewer, for these publications. At the time of their writing, all were serving 
extended prison sentences and were leading members of the IG’s 15-member Majlis Al-Shura 
(Consultative Council, the leading organ of the IG).
e #rst four publications provide a comprehensive, systematic refutation of the IG’s own 
earlier misguided jihadism. Published in 2002, these volumes deal, respectively, with: an 
introduction, overview, and explanation of the rationale for their declaration (in 1997) of a 
unilateral, unconditional cessation of violence; [7] the shari’a of lawful military jihad;[8] the 
shari’a governing tak#r; [9] and, the shari’a regulating the practice of commanding right and 
forbidding wrong (al-amr bi’l-ma’ruf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar).[10] e next year (2003) 
witnessed the publication of three additional volumes, one illuminating the IG’s recollection of 
its odyssey as an Islamist organization committed to the promotion of Allah’s Word and 
Shari’a [11]; two others, of considerable interest to the argument of the present article, oﬀer 
speci#c - and in this writer’s view, devastating - shari’a-based criticisms of AQ.[12] Other key 
volumes examine from a shari’a and realistic point of view, the concept of Allah’s absolute 
sovereignty (Al-Hakimiyya)[13]; oﬀer a refutation of the inevitability of a ‘clash of civilizations’ 
between Islamism and the West[14]; and also supplies another shari’a-based critique of AQ.
[15]
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Corrections, Not Revisions: a Return to the Mainstream Sunnite Orthodox Shari’a of the Lawful 
Military Jihad.
ough sometimes referred to as ‘revisionism’ or ‘revisions,’ this writer holds that the 
translation of the Arabic term as Corrections (Tas ’heeh) is more to the point since the latter 
connotes a return to Sunni orthodoxy with regard to the legally sanctioned waging of the 
jihad, and not as the former implies, a decisive reinterpretation of the chief objectives and 
modalities of lawful conduct of jihad according to Islamic sources for making the Word of 
Allah supreme.[16] It is noteworthy, however, that a revised interpretation of objective 
contextual factors has led to a dramatic shi in the IG’s strategic assessments.[17]
e considered judgment of scholars like Peters (2005) and Salem (2002) is shared by the 
writer of this article. Peters has declared that “[t]he new positions [c. 2002- ] on the jihad duty 
of the Jama’a Islamiyya are not novel. ey agree with the doctrine of jihad as expounded in 
the classical books on Islamic law. However, interest lies in their self-criticism and their 
polemical nature, since they refute [their] previous militant positions and legal interpretations 
calling for the indiscriminate use of violence.” [18] Salem similarly states that the IG’s works 
rectify “a radical reinterpretation of a key Islamic concept [i.e. the application to current 
Islamic governments of Sayyid Qutb’s (1906-1966) deviant interpretation of the concept 
‘jahiliyya’], and also a radical divergence from classical Sunni political thought” and that the 
“Gama’ah’s re-examination of its ideology and modus-operandi signals a triumph of non-
confrontational, non-revolutionary trends in classical Sunni political thought” .[19]
Jihad-Realism as Premise
e IG unequivocally states, in several passages, its commitment to the military jihad as a 
binding religious imperative. Ali al-Sharif states (2007), for example, that “[j]ihad is a religious 
duty, . . . ordained to crush sedition and shirk [polytheism] from the face of the earth.”[20] Dr. 
Najih Ibrahim similarly states: “e initiative [to permanently and unconditionally cease 
violence] did not invalidate jihad. e initiative states that jihad is a religious duty that will last 
until Judgment Day. However, there are several controls and conditions for that duty. How can 
it be said aer that that it invalidates jihad,” he concludes, “merely because it decided that the 
conditions for jihad were absent in Egypt?” [21] In their chief work on the rules regulating the 
jihad [22], authors Hamdi Abd-al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Azim, Najih Ibrahim, and Ali Mohammad 
al-Sharif, declared in 2002:
Jihad in the cause of God [jihad $ sabil Allah] is the noblest and greatest of 
endeavors. Since jihad requires the expenditure of wealth, the desertion of wives 
and oﬀspring, the abandonment of domicile and homeland, and since it requires 
the killing of people and the shedding of blood, it is only right that shari’ah should 
surround it with the greatest controls and the most binding rules to prevent the 
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shedding of blood in every place and for every reason, and also to prevent 
disorderly con%ict where the killer knows not why he is killing and the killed 
knows not for what he is being killed!!
Peters, in his careful analysis of the IG’s Corrections reaches an identical conclusion to the 
one of the IG. Considering the question whether the rejection of violence involves a rejection 
of the jihad of the sword (jihad bis saif), he states that this “does not mean that the duty of 
jihad has come to an end or lost its force, because, if the circumstances change, the jihad 
becomes obligatory again. . . .e new positions on the jihad duty of the Egyptian Jama’a 
Islamiyya are not novel. ey agree with the doctrine of jihad as expounded in the classical 
books of Islamic law.”
It is therefore not a question whether jihad is a binding religious prescription: it 
unquestionably is. It is a question of whether and how one is to conduct it by lawful and 
prudent means. And it is precisely this question that profoundly and irremediably divides the 
IG’s Corrections from the path followed by AQ. In the following section, this contrast is 
systematically explored - #rst at the level of general vision, and then in relation to very speci#c 
and binding provisions of the sharia of lawful military jihad.
e Ultimate Goal of Islam
Despite its ennobled provenance, the ultimate goal of Islam is, according to the IG, not 
jihad, but Islam. Islam’s universal mission is to create a world in which the Word of Allah, 
Lord of the Worlds, is proclaimed and the message of the Oneness of Allah and His righteous 
path is universally and faithfully spread. It is also a world that has practically implemented 
fundamental Islamic precepts and shari’a-based prescriptions and proscriptions as the basis of 
all human social relationships. In this respect, Islam maintains with other universal faiths - 
Christianity, for example - a universalist mission to spread the Truth of Salvation, to bring 
persons to that Truth, and to transform individuals at the level of their internal psychological 
being, interpersonal relations, social responsibilities and obligations.
is is evident when in IG writings it is stated that the Corrections demand a “return to 
their original mission as preachers of God’s word who help guide His creatures to His straight 
path” and that “[o]ur noble goal is what [God’s] messengers had told their peoples. Our goal is 
to make people pray to their God, that is, guide His creatures. We must be courageous enough 
to embark on any decision that we believe achieves this goal. We must also be courageous 
enough to refrain from any decision that we believe puts a distance between this goal and us. 
We must also have greater and greater courage to desist from any decision or step that some of 
us actually takes if it becomes clear that it will not help us reach this goal.” [23] “e end in 
this case,” the historic leaders declare, “is to guide people and call them to embrace Allah’s 
religion. As for jihad, it is only a means to an end. . . [T]he ultimate goal is to guide people to 
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the path of God. erefore we emphasize that reality in Egypt has proved that guiding people 
to the path of God must be the #rst and last objective.” [24]
Jihad Not an End, but One Duty and One Means
Al Qaeda, in stark contrast, has, according to the IG, transformed jihad into a fetish and in 
that process subverted its instrumental nature and relation to other Islamic duties. Jihad, as IG 
historic leaders declare, is only one of several religious duties in Islam, is a means rather than 
an end, and is only one means by which “to raise the banner of Islam”.[25] Najih Ibrahim 
forcefully contrasts the diﬀerence between the IG and AQ by claiming that “he [Dr. Ayman al-
Zawahiri] can see only one way forward, which is jihad, and he considers that anyone who 
adopts any other option is a traitor.” [26] Ibrahim asserts against AQ when explaining the IG’s 
refusal to join its violent terroristic campaign that it is “because their goal is jihad, whereas our 
goal is Islam. . . . ” and that “Al-Zawahiri is committed to the theory that #ghting is an 
aim. . .” [27] Abd-al-Gahni, #nally, states that “ . . . jihad is just a means to an end. e end in 
this case it to guide people and call them to embrace Allah’s religion. . . [G]uiding people to 
the path of God must be the #rst and last objective.” [28]
e ree Essential Conditions for Legitimate Military Jihad: Legality, Probability, and 
Sincerity
According to the IG then, the ultimate goal for AQ is not Islam but Jihad for Jihad’s sake. In 
its vision, all available means for promoting Allah’s Word have been reduced to one only—the 
military jihad. is conception may be accurately characterized as “Jihadism” or perhaps 
jihad-fetishism. But Jihadism is also, and especially for the IG, an unlawful and murderous 
deviation; for it is not merely a doctrine that is at stake, but that AQ is guilty of conducting 
forbidden and gravely sinful acts in the name of Islam, and that AQ has caused great harm to 
the Islamic Call. Table 1(see below) provides a brief synopsis of these violations and can be 
consulted to facilitate greater comprehension of the discussion to follow.
As can be seen in the le hand column of Table 1, the IG’s alleged case against AQ rests on 
the three essential bases within orthodox Sunnite jurisprudence—legality, probability, and 
sincerity—for the waging of the military jihad.[29] Let us consider each in turn.[30]
Legality
According to the IG, the military jihad must be waged lawfully. Lawfulness comprises two 
distinct dimensions: unconditional, categorical prescriptions or proscriptions, independent of 
consequences, vis-à-vis the taking of life (killing) of speci#c classes of person; and second, 
judging the legality of jihad principally in terms of its consequences (bene#cial, or harmful) 
for the Islamic cause.[31]
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AQ’s Violation of the Lives and Property of Persons Protected by Law.
According to the IG, AQ has expanded its targeting to include categories of person that on 
mainstream Sunnite legal grounds it is forbidden (haram) to target, including non-combatants 
(‘civilians’) who are not at war with Muslims nor infringing the da’wa call to Islam, but also 
various categories of person--not part of an organized military, male #ghting force--involved 
in generalized civilian pursuits who have not taken up arms. Speci#cally, it is forbidden to kill: 
women, children, and the elderly; persons who are blind; a member of a protected non-
Muslim group [dhimmi] who is not actively combating Muslims; religious monks; various 
categories of non-combatants who labour, such as a slave, peasants, or crasmen who are 
neither combatants nor resisting the Muslims; in#del merchants conducting business on the 
basis of fair exchange and in peaceful commerce with Muslims; non-Muslim travelers, traders, 
or tourists because they are dutifully owed a right to safety and personal security in their lives, 
property, and honor (aman); persons on the basis of mere nationality or citizenship (e.g. 
“Americans,” “British”); the numerous violations directly caused by the 9/11 hijacking of a 
civilian aircra; [32] every and any Muslim in general; and, Muslims deemed ‘human shields,’ 
except under the most extraordinary, exacting, and catastrophic of circumstances.[33]
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Table 1: e IG’s ree Essential Conditions for Legitimate Jihad
e Probability of Harmful Eﬀects/Negative Consequences
According to the IG, a second condition for the lawfulness of jihad is that of a strong 
likelihood that the military jihad will not lead to harmful eﬀects or negative consequences for 
the Umma. e IG asserts the need “’to make bene#ts paramount in any action that the 
Muslim or a Muslim group does” and that if a course of action involves potential harm 
“[r]epelling harm has priority over obtaining bene#ts”.[34] e prioritizing of interests is vital 
to the IG Corrections and suﬀuses their broader return to orthodoxy with a realistic cast that 
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obviously privileges rationalistically based actions over irrational, ill-considered plans and 
their likely harmful results. e IG states:
[A]ny action should be dictated by the religious bene$t, either when it is $rst 
initiated or when it veers from the right course and has to be corrected. In other 
words, any persons deciding to do something should put bene$t above harm. If he 
sees before he embarks on it or aer he starts it that the harm is paramount and 
there is no bene$t at all, then he should desist immediately. ere is no doubt that 
this long experience has proved that this spilled blood and these grinding battles 
have not brought any worthwhile bene$t but resulted in too much harm. . . e 
spilled blood and the slain people are from one religion and there are in addition 
the feuds and hatreds that have $lled souls. . . Someone might say: What about 
the injustice and persecution from which we are suﬀering? We say: Patience. We 
believe that the reward for patience here is better and weightier in the scales. All 
the eﬀorts must rally to stop these futile actions that only bring destruction to a 
people from the same religion.[35]
It is not only unlawfulness but imprudence and a brazen, reckless disregard for interests 
that the 9/11 attacks were conducted, according to IG. A “well known principle for all those 
involved in Islam” is that the interests of the group outweigh those of an individual, and those 
of the group, the state. By violating this principle in order to pursue a personal vendetta 
against the US, [36] Al-Qa’ida in “the 11 September incident . . . . caused the . . . newborn State 
of Afghanistan to perish,” Najih Ibrahim concludes, “and the al-Qa’ida organization [also] 
perished itself.”[37]
In sum, if the military jihad leads to greater harms, e.g. catalyzing widespread opposition to 
Islam, increasing enmity against Muslims and, undermining the safety and security of the 
Muslim Umma, or further empowering its enemies, then, on consequentialist grounds (i.e. 
“the jurisprudence of results”) military jihad is prohibited. If the objective of jihad is to leave 
the Umma in a better position aer the jihad than before, then only those actions that 
contribute to power, sovereignty, security, honour, safety, and expansion are permissible.
Unlawful Killing Based on Alleged Apostasy (Tak$r) of the Ruler or Regime
e IG’s extensive internal self-criticism led to a rejection of virtually all violence directed 
at actually existing governments, whether autocratic and corrupt or not, in Muslim majority 
societies. First, the costs to the Muslim community of violent rebellion almost always 
outweigh the bene#ts. is is also well-attested in general Sunnite prohibitions against 
sedition and violent rebellion.
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Second, actual tak$r involves not merely dereliction, corruption, laxity, sinfulness, or an 
inability or unwillingness to enforce the sharia, but an actual betrayal and treasonous 
willingness to permit or invite the enemies of Islam to defeat the Islamic state. ird, the tasks 
and unique responsibilities of those charged with statecra oen demand an engagement with 
the world as it is, and the necessity of preserving and furthering one’s interests in a world very 
much not of one’s choosing. It is therefore inadvisable to demand that puri#ed religious 
functionaries govern the state, and it is also necessary to understand the demands and 
responsibilities of rulership. Fourth, youthful radicalism and impatience must be supplanted 
by a long view and the embrace of a long-term evolutionary strategy, building from the 
bottom-up, to win the society for Islam through da’wa, education, and reform.
Fih, the IG criticize their previous use of the concept ‘kufr al-nizam’ (unbelief of the 
regime), since the concept ‘regime’ is a depersonalized abstraction, despite the reality that it 
involves millions of persons involved in millions of tasks and thousands of institutions, 
processes, products, and personnel required to conduct the state’s business. To say that a 
building, or institution, or machine, or component of ‘the regime’ is apostate removes the 
primacy of the individual person whose faith is being judged. Finally, and perhaps most 
important, the IG subjects Sayyid Qutb’s rendering of the concept of Allah’s Absolute 
Sovereignty (al-Hakimiyya) to withering criticism, and insist that God’s absolute sovereignty 
creates the framework within which humankind, as Allah’s Vice-regents on earth, can and 
should exercise legitimate authority and promote the best interests of the Umma.[38]
For the post-Corrections IG, tak$r is the deviation at the core of extremist intolerance, 
mindless violence, and hair-splitting internecine warfare among Muslims whose principal 
occupation becomes judging the ‘Muslimness’ of others and heresy hunting, rather than 
raising the Word of Allah. Najih Ibrahim’s recent article in relation to the rise of ‘tak#ri groups’ 
in the Sinai launching violent attacks on the Egyptian army provides a vivid description of, 
and warning against, this ultra-fanaticism. [39] One can easily imagine Ibrahim’s all-too-
personal reaction to those memories of his very own earlier dark descent into tak#rism when 
he declares: “We must fully realize that allowing tak#r ideologies to spread in society will 
inevitably lead to blood spilling. Mistaken concepts generate wrongdoing. ose who imagine 
that there can be mistaken concepts without subsequent wrongdoing are deluding themselves. 
Wake up . . . Egypt!” [40]
Probability as a Function of Strategic Realism, Capabilities, Conditions, Consequences
e decision whether to wage jihad bis saif, the IG asserts, must also be based on a hard-
headed strategic realism that factors into account one’s capabilities relative to actual and 
potential adversaries; objective and subjective conditions (i.e. socio-cultural and socio-
political contexts, environmental variables of all sorts, necessary prerequisites for successful 
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armed actions) required for the success of one’s own as well as enemy forces; and a realistic 
assessment of the likelihood that the bene#ts to the Islamic Call of embarking on a policy of 
armed military clashes outweigh its costs.
Strategic Realism
To be lawful, according to the IG, the jihad of the sword must be based on an objective 
assessment of genuine historical, social, political, cultural, and economic realities. Especially 
important is an objective assessment of one’s adversary’s motives, strengths, and capacities, 
relative to one’s own. AQ’s reckless disregard for historical facts prevented AQ from conceiving 
the U.S. as a self-interested actor whose interests were not necessarily unremittingly hostile to 
those of the Islamic movements or Islam. “[A]ny observer of US strategy will #nd that the 
prime mover of this strategy is US interests rather than the religious factor,” al-Minawi states 
in paraphrasing the IG’s position and further he notes that this “explains many major events in 
which the United States appeared to be supportive of some Islamic issues, such as support for 
the Afghan jihad in 1979 against the Soviet presence.” As to post 9/11 US policies, he 
continues, “the authors [i.e. IG co-authors] conclude that Al-Qa’ida’s strategy was one of the 
most important factors that hastened the formulation of this US strategy that is negative 
toward the Muslim world.” Instead than focusing on a pragmatic, realist interest-based 
engagement with the United States which could, he states “have realized the interests of 
Afghanistan” on the grounds of the US’s broader “strategy toward Central Asia,” it would be 
“Al-Qa’ida’s strategy [which ] . . . hastened the formulation of that negative US strategy . . . that 
led to the downfall of the Taliban Islamic State.” [41]
Moreover, strategic realism demands an objective acknowledgment of one’s own causal role 
in history. In absolute contrast to AQ’s “Crusader-Zionist” conspiracy theory, or other wildly 
rampant conspiracy theories produced to explain or excuse present-Muslim weaknesses, the 
post-Corrections IG instead forcefully and self-consciously assumes ownership for its own 
actions—including extremely destructive actions—and on that basis produced the Corrective 
concepts required to re-launch their Islamist presence.[42] “[C]ontrary to the well-known 
conspiracy theory,” Najih Ibrahim states, “[w]e . . . consolidated the great Qur’an principle, 
which loosely translated reads that the plight of a person was of his own doing” and though he 
admits it is true that various enemies conspire against each other, it is also the case that
conspiring does not represent the only will that makes the world go round, turns 
the course of events, and interprets everything that happens in history. e 
conspiracy theory truly means taking leave of one’s will so that only the will of the 
CIA and the Mossad prevail. en we blame our mistakes and apathy on the 
United States, the Israeli conspiracy, and other states, as if we had no role in 
everything that happened in this world.[43]
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Having established the necessity of rejecting conspiracism and accepting historical agency, 
it is requisite then that one carefully assess the strategic environment, i.e. the sum total of 
forces and factors that one must attempt to take into account before conceiving, planning, and 
executing any type of militant action. e IG counsels, for example, the necessity that “a young 
man should try to read his reality locally, regionally, and internationally so that his acts and 
behavior do not weaken his country and help its enemies defeat it.” [44]
Strategic realism also in&uences the manner in which one understands the process of 
issuing legal opinions. A properly formulated legal opinion (fatwa) demands that one is 
capable of correctly and carefully relating the worlds of legal judgment and empirical fact. As 
Najih Ibrahim states, the “Shari’ah cannot be separated from reality. You must read both reality 
and the relevant text before applying the right verses to the appropriate reality. Mistakes stem 
from the fact that the right text is sometimes applied on irrelevant reality.” [45] Far from being 
divorced from reality, “[i]t is an obvious mistake to take positions, pass judgment, and issue 
fatwas . . . without looking at the reality, understanding its facts, and considering them one of 
the principal reasons for these fatwas. Any judgment or fatwa,” they continue, “should be 
based on two fundamental maxims: e reality and its facts and the religious evidence that is 
in the Koran, the Sunna, or any of the recognized sources of jurisprudence.” [46]
is intrinsic relation between fatwa and reality also led to fundamental rethinking by the 
IG about the nature of contemporary socio-political authority, governance, and the criteria 
that may be used to evaluate the Islamic nature of modern Muslim-majority nation-states. It is 
no longer possible, nor legally permissible, to apply classic fatawa produced under 
dramatically dissimilar circumstances—for example, Ibn Taymiyya’s 14th century fatawa 
produced aer the fall of Baghdad and the rise of Mongol rule over Muslim subjects— to 
contemporary Egyptian society. e IG’s careful revisiting and rereading of those classic texts 
led them to reverse their earlier judgment that the contemporary Egyptian state was analogous 
to the medieval Mongol Tatar state. Finally, the IG determined that notions of Allah’s Absolute 
sovereignty can and must also be made compatible with the rise of modern sociopolitical 
orders such that humans are viewed as participating in a God-based, but human-administered 
and executed, governing relationship.[47]
Capabilities and Conditions
e assessment of the probable success of a lawful military jihad requires that one 
objectively assess one’s relative capabilities, conditions, and opportunities in relation to one’s 
potential and actual allies and adversaries. e IG accuses AQ of neglecting this essential 
condition since “Al-Qa’ida . . . called for a jihad that puts the logic of challenge above the 
principle of calculations, the preservation of interests, the availability of capabilities, and the 
perception of the goals.” [48]
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Moreover, the IG accuses AQ of wildly in&ating their chances of victory and irrationally 
expanding the scope of enemies they would simultaneously challenge. “Usama Bin Ladin was 
aiming for what is called an impossible objective,” Najih Ibrahim states,” since he sought to 
“expel Russia from Chechnya, India from Kashmir, and to attack Algeria, Tunisia, France, and 
Libya, as well as evict America from the Gulf. All this is impossible,” he concludes, “even if Bin 
Ladin possessed a superpower. Never in his life did the Prophet #ght on two fronts or go to 
war against two enemies at the same time.” [49] Summarizing the IG’s position al-Minawi 
relates that “the leaders of Al Qa’ida entangled the Muslim nation in a con&ict that was beyond 
its power to wage, a con&ict that it did not want.” [50]
Consequences
Finally, just as in the earlier discussion of legality, the probable consequences resulting from 
launching a military jihad must be objectively assessed. Again, a hard-headed strategically 
realist assessment should have led AQ to drastically revise its strategy of mass-casualty 
terrorist attacks directed at multiple regimes throughout the Muslim and Western world. 
Good strategy requires that one consider various dimensions of validity (e.g. suitability of 
methods, sustainability of means, acceptability and legitimacy of ends, methods and means), 
and also various factors associated with diﬀerent courses of action, and what strategic eﬀects 
are likely to result from deliberate courses of action that will lead to transforming a given 
equilibrium among con&ict actors. [51] If judged by its strategic eﬀects, AQ’s strategy must be 
judged a strategic catastrophe for the Muslim umma. Consider then the net result of AQ’s 
strategic legacy recalling that the singular objective of the Islamist movement is to attain world 
dominance, and to expand the sphere within which the Call and da’wa is enabled. Al-Minawi 
succinctly summarizes these eﬀects: “1. It led to the collapse of the young Muslim state in 
Afghanistan 2. Al-Qa’ida and the Islamic movements were hunted down as part of security 
globalization 3. Al Qa’ida’s strategy hurt the interests and issues of the Muslim minorities [in 
non-Muslim majority states] by deliberately confusing between terrorism and resistance 
movements against occupation,. 4. It paved the way for the realization of Israel’s objectives and 
designs.” [52]
Najih Ibrahim also links AQ’s failure to objectively assess capabilities and conditions to 
disastrous strategic eﬀects when he states that “Bin Ladin believes in the principle of Jihad for 
the sake of Jihad. Attaining the results is not important” and that “[w]hat matters for him is 
that the Jihad embers should be fanned. is is wrong,” he continues, since “ Jihad was 
ordained to bolster religion, not to spill blood . . . Bin Ladin fought the whole world. is is 
why it is natural that he is defeated . . . and he cannot blame God but should blame 
himself.”[53]
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Sincerity of Intentions
Sincerity is a #nal necessary condition for the lawful waging of the military jihad. ough 
exceptions exist, for the most part the IG’s critique of AQ assumes the sincerity of its motives; 
beyond what it deems AQ’s violations of the jurisprudence regulating the jihad ($qh al- jihad) 
then, the IG’s primary focus is pointing at AQ’s catastrophic practical and strategic failures 
(prudence, interests). is is likely a pragmatic move since the IG seeks to persuade potential 
or actual AQ followers and impugning motives is generally a losing strategy; however, there is 
a genuine sense that Bin Laden’s ignorance and misguidedness rather than insincerity is the 
greater culprit. [54]
e only legitimate motive for a Muslim to wage the military jihad is that it be pursued to 
raise the Word of Allah and that the struggle be carried out exclusively in loyalty to that 
objective: i.e. jihad in the path of Allah (jihad $ sabil Allah). Even if one has these sincere 
intentions, however, the lawful military jihad must also factor in the possibility of harmful 
eﬀects and if these eﬀects outweigh likely bene#ts, sincerity of motive must defer to a strategic 
calculus of likely eﬀects.[55]
Conclusion
It is the present writer’s view that the jurisprudence regulating the jihad ($qh al-jihad) is at 
present under-exploited as a potential means for delegitimising AQ’s justi#cation for the use of 
terrorism. A detailed exposition of the IG’s shari’a-based case as presented in its ‘Corrective 
Concepts Series’ (Silsilat Tahih al-Mafahi) leads to the following conclusions. ough the IG 
and AQ regard jihad as an enduring, binding religious prescription, according to the IG, AQ 
illegitimately isolates jihad as an end rather than a means, and the singular method of Islamic 
faith and action when means are being considered. Second, according to the IG, AQ &agrantly 
violates at least two of three essential requirements for the waging of the military jihad: 
legality, probability, and to a lesser extent, sincerity. Al-Qaeda violates, they assert, 
prohibitions against harming persons in their lives, honour, and property; and the moral 
obligation to privilege vital interests and carefully calculate the probable consequences for 
Islam and the Islamic Call likely to result from AQs terrorist actions.
ird, AQ’s strategic irrationality rests on many fabricated premises: a distorted account of 
US interests vis-à-vis the Muslim world thereby underestimating potential bases of strategic 
advance for the umma; the propagation of conspiracy theories instead of AQ’s admission that 
it has voluntarily chosen a disastrous, counterproductive course; misapplications of medieval 
jurisprudential fatawa to contemporary sociopolitical contexts; AQ’s failure to recognize the 
living relationship in the present international context between sacred sources, judicial 
opinions, and empirical realities. Al-Qaeda’s strategic irrationalism explains also its failure to 
factor in the capabilities and conditions required for successful military jihad, and again, the 
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probable strategic eﬀects likely to result from its strategic choices. Finally, AQ’s violation of the 
sincerity criterion while less suspect, surfaced on those occasions when Usama bin Ladin’s 
vengeance against the US obviously motivated his actions. More generally, however, sincere 
intentions are no substitute for hard-headed genuine strategic planning and deemed an 
insuﬃcient criterion for engaging in a legitimate and jurisprudentially sanctioned jihad. It is in 
concrete results and consequences (or the lack thereof) for Islam and not ulterior motives, that 
AQ’s strategic eﬀects on the Islamic Call and Word of Allah must be calculated.
A Policy Recommendation
It is advisable that scholars and government analysts suﬃciently trained in Islamic 
jurisprudence systematically examine the orthodox sunnite $qh al-jihad and its potential for 
delegitimising Al-Qaeda’s anti-Western mass casualty terrorism. Should knowledgeable 
experts conclude that such leverage exists, one could derive from this Islamist variant of the 
legal instrument highly suggestive themes for strategic communication oﬀensives by US allies 
and partners in the Arab and Muslim world. Finally, leveraging the shari’a of lawful military 
jihad can and should facilitate a more eﬀective, precisely targeted means for reaching those 
persons whose attachment to Islamic legality is a sin qua non for their own personal genuine 
quest to raise the Word of Allah supreme throughout the earth. at this may also partially 
facilitate the disruption, dismantlement, and eventual defeat of AQ is, in the end, a bene#t for 
all parties - Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Both stand to gain by ridding the world of al-
Qai’da.
About the Author: Paul Kamolnick is a professor of sociology in the Department of Sociology 
and Anthropology, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, Tennessee, USA. He teaches 
courses in classical and contemporary social theory, and the sociology of global terrorism. He is 
the author most recently of Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach (US Army War 
College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2012) and “Al Qaeda’s Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and 
the Jurisprudence of Lawful Military Jihad,” (Studies in Con%ict and Terrorism, Vol. 36, 2013, pp. 
394-418).
Notes
[1] Isam Dirbalah, member of the Islamic Group’s Shura Council, in Abd al-Latif al-Manawi, “Egyptian Islamic Group Leaders React to Abu-
Hamzah Al-Masri’s Criticism,” July 4, 2003; available in www.opensource.gov ; accessed 5 February 2013.
[2] Najih Ibrahim, Ali al-Sharif, and Hamdi Abd-al-Rahman, Casting a Light on the Errors Made in Jihad, in Muhammad Salah, “Egypt’s 
Islamic Group Spells Out ‘Controls’ and ‘Rules’ Governing Jihad,” 3 February 2002; available in www.opensource.gov; accessed 8 January 
2013. Unless otherwise noted, an 8 January 2013 access date should be assumed throughout for all www.opensource.gov documents.
[3] Author Anonymous; 2012, 2013.
[4] See, e.g. Author Anonymous 2012, pp. vii-viii, 5-6; also, 2013, pp. xx). For select academic accounts of this binding religious prescription, 
see for example: E. Tyan, “”Djihad,” Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965; David Cook, Understanding Jihad, Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 2005; W. Gardner, “Jihad,” e Moslem World, volume 2, 1912, pp. 347-357; Majid Khadduri, War and 
Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, Book II, e Law of War: e Jihad, pp. 51-137; Rudolph Peters, ed., Jihad: In 
Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader, 2nd edition, Princeton, NJ: Marcus Wiener, 2005; Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines 
and Practice, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 	   	   	  	  	       Volume 7, Issue 5
106	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   October 2013
[5]Omar Ashour (e Deradicalization of Jihadists: transforming Islamist movements, New York, Routledge, 2009, p. 103) refers to “around 25 
volumes to dismantle their previous position and legitimize their new stance on an Islamic basis” referencing here (2007, p. 613) which itself 
seems confusing since the 2007 work states that four books were published in 2002 later followed by “16 others” (adding up to 20, not 25).
[6]According to Ashour (“Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of the De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist Movements: e Case of the 
Egyptian Islamic Group,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 4, Autumn 2007, p. 596, n.1), the term ‘historical leaders’ was “coined by the 
Egyptian media and it refers to the IG leadership of the 1970s. Almost all of these leaders were sentenced in the so-called al-Jihad Trials of 
1981 following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat”; they “represent the majority in the Shura Council of the IG.”
[7] Usamah Ibrahim Ha$z and Asim Abd al-Magid Mohammed, e Initiative to Cease Violence: A Realistic Vision and a View Based on the 
Shari’a (Mibadarat waf al-‘unf: ru’ya wagi’iyya-wa-nazra shar’iyya), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002.
[8] Hamdi Abd-al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Azim, Najih Ibrahim, and Ali Mohammad al-Sharif, Shedding Light on the Errors at Were Committed 
During the Waging of Jihad, (Taslit al-adwa ‘alama waga’ $’ al-jihad min akhta’), Cairo,:Maktaba al-Turath al-Islami, 2002.
[9]Najih Ibrahim and Ali Al-Sharif, e Ban on Extremism in Religion and on the Excommunication of Muslims (Hurmat al-ghuluww $ al-din 
wa-tak$r al-Muslimin), Cairo: Maktaba al-Turath al-Islami, 2002.
[10]Ali Al-Sharif and Usama Ibrahim Ha$z, Counsel and Clari%cation Regarding the Recti%cation of the Concepts Used by ose Who Assume 
Responsibility for the Religion and Morals of Society (Al-nash wa-l-tabyin $ tashih mafahim al-muhtasibin), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-
Islami, 2002.
[11]Karam Muhammad Zuhdi, Ali Muhammad Ali al-Sharif et al. e River of Memories (Nahr al-dhikrayat: al-muraja’at al-$qhiyya li-l-
Jama’at al-Islamiyya), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2003.
[12]Isam al-Din Dirbalah, e al-Qa’ida Organization’s Strategy and Bombings: Mistakes and Rulings (Istratijiyat wa Tairat al-Qa’ida: al-
Akhta wa al-Akhtar), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2003; Karam Muhammad Zuhdi, Ali Muhammad Ali al-Sharif et al., e Riyadh 
Bombings: Rulings and Consequences (Tairat al-Riad: al-Akham wa-l-athar), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islam, 2003.
[13]Najih Ibrahim, Authority: Shari’a View and Realistic Vision (Al-Hakimah: Nzrah Shar’iyah wa Ru’yah Wagi’iyah), multiple parts serialized 
in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 2005, beginning 27 July 2005.
[14]Najih Ibrahim et al., Guidance of People Between Means and Ends (Hidayyat al-Khala’iq bayna al-Ghayat wa al-Wasa’il), Cairo: al-Abikan, 
2005; See also, Ashour 2007, op. cit.,p. 613.
[15]Isam al-Din Dirbalah, Islam and the Laws of War (Al-Islam wa-tahdhib al-hurub), serialized in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 2006, 27 August 
through 4 September, 2006.
[16]See Anonymous Author (2013, p. 5) for a similar argument applied to the corrective writings of former Islamic Jihad emir and Al-Qaeda 
shari’a guide, Dr. Sayyid Imam Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al-Sharif (aka: Dr. Fadl).
[17] See, for example: Najih Ibrahim quoted in “Egyptian Experts Discuss ‘Jurisprudential Revisions’ in Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah,” 23 
November 2012; Dr. Najih Ibrahim, “Revisions from the Islamic Group Down to Al-Jihad Organization,” cited in “Egypt: Statement by 
Leading Islamic Group Figure Says No-Violence Initiative Strong, 2 July 2007; Usamah Ibrahim Ha$z and Ali Mohammed Al-Sharif, e 
Initiative to Stop Violence: a realistic vision and a view based on the shari’a (Mubadarat waqf al-unf: ru’ya waqi’iyya-wa-nzra shar’iyya; Cairo: 
Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002, in Ahmad Musa, “Egypt: Islamic Group Leaders Con$rm ‘No Violence Initiative’,” 9 February 2002.
[18] Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, Marcus Weiner/Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 183.
[19] Nasser Salem, “ ‘Global’ Muslim Website Report Examines Egyptian Group’s Renunciation of Violence,” Markham Muslimedia WWW-
Text in English, 30 November 2002, www.opensource.gov.
[20]“Revisions from the Islamic Group Down to Al-Jihad Organization,” cited in “Egypt: Statement by Leading Islamic Group Figure Says 
No-Violence Initiative Strong, 2 July 2007.
[21]Shedding Light on the Errors at Were Committed During the Waging of Jihad, (Taslit al-adwa ‘alama waga’ $’ al-jihad min akhta’), Cairo, 
Maktaba al-Turath al-Islami, 2002.
[22]See also reference to “the noble objective for which jihad was made a duty by shari’ah, namely, to establish religion and raise the banner of 
the Oneness of God. Fighting is a duty whose purpose is to prevent sedition and repulse idolatry.” In, Najih Ibrahim, Ali al-Sharif, and Hamdi 
Abd-al-Rahman, Casting a Light on the Errors Made in Jihad,in Muhammad Salah, “Egypt’s Islamic Group Spells Out ‘Controls’ and ‘Rules’ 
Governing Jihad,” 3 February 2002; Referencing here the classic Quranic surah 8:39.
[23]Usamah Ibrahim Ha$z and Asim Abd al-Magid Mohammed, e Initiative to Cease Violence: A Realistic Vision and a View Based on the 
Shari’a (Mibadarat waf al-‘unf: ru’ya wagi’iyya-wa-nazra shar’iyya), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002—in Muhammad Salah, “Egypt: 
IG Outlines Reasons for Peace Initiative, Islamic Movements’ Future,” Al-Hayah in Arabic, 2 February 2002, p. 5, in www.opensource.gov.
[24]Egyptian Islamic Group Shura Council member Safwat Abd-al-Ghani, in [Chief editor], Makrum Muhammad Ahmad, “Egypt: Interview 
with Islamic Group Leaders on Recent Revision of eir Ideology,” 21 June 2002.
See also: “ose who wanted to brand the Islamic Group as exclusively jihad oriented have failed to understand the message of Islam, which 
gives prominence to $delity and to spreading the Word of Allah. e groups’s message covers all religious duties” (Usamah Ibrahim Ha$z and 
Assem Abd-al-Majid Mohammed, e Initiative to Cease Violence: A Realistic Vision and a View Based on the Shari’a (Mibadarat waf al-‘unf: 
ru’ya wagi’iyya-wa-nazra shar’iyya), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002, in Ahmad Musa, “Egypt: Islamic Group Leaders Con$rm ‘No 
Violence Initiative,’” in Al-Ahram in Arabic, 9 February 2002, in www.opensource.gov).
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 	   	   	  	  	       Volume 7, Issue 5
107	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   October 2013
[25]Quoted in Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, “Part 1 of Book Review of e Strategy and Bombings of Al-Qa’ida (2003): Egyptian Islamist Leaders 
Fault Al-Qaida’s Strategy,” 11 January 2004.
[26] Najih Ibrahim, quoted in Abduh Zaynah, “Egypt: Islamic Group eoretician on Political Future, Disputes with Al-Qa’ida,” in Al Sharq 
al-Awsat (Internet Version-WWW) in Arabic, 13 August 2006, in www.opensource.gov.
[27]Translated from Arabic Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), quoted in MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 1301, September 27, 2006, available at 
www.memri.org/report/en/print1887.htm,; accessed 16 January 2013.
[28] Quoted in Makrum Muhammad Ahmad, , “Egypt: Interview with Islamic Group Leaders on Recent Revision of eir Ideology,” 21 June 
2002.
[29]Peters (2005, pp. 180-183) lists these three criteria as essential to the classical jihad doctrine, and provides an excellent, if brief, general 
overview of the general legal correctives proposed by the IG. e discussion that follows provides greater speci$city and highlights the IG’s 
and AQ’s radically diverging positions.
[30]e following sources were consulted for the section to follow: Book 1 excerpts--Usamah Ibrahim Ha$z and Asim Abd al-Magid 
Mohammed, e Initiative to Cease Violence: A Realistic Vision and a View Based on the Shari’a (Mibadarat waf al-‘unf: ru’ya wagi’iyya-wa-
nazra shar’iyya), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002—in Muhammad Salah, “Report Views Attempt to Rebuild Egypt’s Jihad Group, 
IG’s Change of Ideas,” Al-Wasat, 11-17 February 2002, pp. 22-23 in Arabic, 11 February 2002, in www.opensource.gov. Book 1 excerpts--
Usamah Ibrahim Ha$z and Asim Abd al-Magid Mohammed, e Initiative to Cease Violence: A Realistic Vision and a View Based on the 
Shari’a (Mibadarat waf al-‘unf: ru’ya wagi’iyya-wa-nazra shar’iyya), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002—in Muhammad Salah, “Egypt: 
IG Outlines Reasons for Peace Initiative, Islamic Movements’ Future,” Al-Hayah in Arabic, 2 February 2002, p. 5, in www.opensource.gov. 
Book 1 excerpts----Usamah Ibrahim Ha$z and Asim Abd al-Magid Mohammed, e Initiative to Cease Violence: A Realistic Vision and a 
View Based on the Shari’a (Mibadarat waf al-‘unf: ru’ya wagi’iyya-wa-nazra shar’iyya), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002, in Ahmad 
Musa, “Egypt: Islamic Group Leaders Con$rm ‘No Violence Initiative,’” in Al-Ahram in Arabic, 9 February 2002, in www.opensource.gov. 
Book 2 excerpts--Hamdi ‘abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Azim, Shedding Light on the Errors at Were Committed During the Waging of Jihad, (Taslit 
al-adwa ‘alama waga’ $’ al-jihad min akhta’), Cairo, Maktaba al-Turath al-Islami, 2002, in Muhammad Salah, “Egypt’s Islamic Group Spells 
Out ‘Controls’ and ‘Rules’ Governing Jihad,” in Al-Hayah (Internet Version-WWW) in Arabic, 3 February 2002, p. 6, in www.opensource.gov. 
Publication of part 1 of AQ’s 2003 book, e Strategy and Bombings of Al-Qai’ida: Errors and Perils (Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, “Part 1 of Book 
Review: Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qaida’s Strategy,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic, 11 January 2004, in www.opensource.gov.); 
several installments of 8th book, Najih Ibrahim, Authority: Shari’a View and Realistic Vision (Al-Hakimah: Nzrah Shar’iyah wa Ru’yah 
Wagi’iyah), serialized in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 2005: 1st installment: “Egyptian Islamic Group Defends Muslim Governments Against In$del 
Charges,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic, 27 July 2005, in www.opensource.gov. 2nd installment: 28 July 2005, “Egyptian Islamic Group Book Al-
Hakimiyah: Judging Rulers to Be In$dels (Part 2),” in www.opensource.gov. 5th installment: 31 July 2005, “Serialization of Latest Book by 
Egyptian Islamic Movement—Part 5,” in www.opensource.gov; accessed 8 January 2013; MEMRI extensive excerpts from translating from 
Arabic 2006 book, Islam and the Laws of War (Al-Islam wa-tahdhib al-hurub) appearing in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat authored by Issam Al-Din 
Dirbalah, deals with themes of fatwas permitting killing of civilians, tak$r, suicide bombings, and categorical rejection of West and its Muslim 
allies; MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 1301, “Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiya vs. Al-Qaeda,” 27 September 2006. excerpts from interviews and 2003 book 
by Isam al-Din Dirbalah, e al-Qa’ida Organization’s Strategy and Bombings: Mistakes and Rulings (Istratijiyat wa Tairat al-Qa’ida: al-Akhta 
wa al-Akhtar).Y. Carmon, Y. Felder, and D. Lav, “e Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological Reversa,” 22 December 
2006; interviews with the historic leadership: Interview with Hamdi Abd al-Rahman. Abduh Zinah, “Egypt: Islamic Group Leader on His 
Background, Group’s ‘Revisions,’ Other Issues,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 24 March 2002. Makram Muhammad, “Egypt: Interview With Islamic 
Group Leaders on Recent Revision of eir Ideology,” Al-Musawwar in Arabic 21 June 2002. Makram Muhamad Ahmad, “Correction: 
Islamic Group Leaders Tour Prisons with Non-Violence Message, Wholesale Release—adding editorial notation,” in Arabic in al-Musawwaar, 
28 June 2002, pp. 4-20, in www.opensource.gov. Q & A, between Muhammad Salah and imprisoned Najih Ibrahim; questions sent with a 
relative who visited him during the weekly visit, and answers sent back: Muhammad Salah, “Egypt’s IG Ideologue Says al-Qa’ida’s Operations 
Bring Ruin, Weaken Muslims,” Al-Hayah, 28 May 2003, p.6, in www.opensource.gov. Statement issued by historic leaders criticizing Abu-
Hamza Al-Masri a copy of which was published by the following press: Abd-al-Latif al-Manawi, “Egyptian Islamic Group Leaders React to 
Abu-Hamza Al-Masri’s Criticism,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic, 4 July 2003, p. 7, in www.opensource.gov. Report of an interview conducted 
with Najih Ibrahim in relation to then-recent Riyadh bombings 8 November 2003 that killed several Muslims in the Saudi capital, FBIS Report 
in Arabic, 22 November 2003, in www.opensource.gov. Interview with Najih Ibrahim contrasting Islamic Group with AQ: Abduh Zaynah, 
“Egypt: Islamic Group eoretician on Political Future, Disputes with al-Qa’ida,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic, 13 August 2006. Discussion 
between 9-17 August 2006, on jihadist website forum between IG’s Ibrahim Ha$z and AQ spokespersons contrasting visions of jihad, and 
alternative policies: Jihadist Websites—OSC Report in Arabic, “Discussion With Al-Qa’ida, Islamic Group Concludes, No Consensus,” 29 
August 2006, www.opensource.gov. Interview with several “Islamist jihadi leaders” but Ibrahim Ha$z is key: Muhammad Nasr Karum, 
“Egyptian Islamists on Impact of Bin Ladin’s Killing,” Al-Quds al-Arabi in Arabic, 4 May 2011, in www.opensource.gov.; Interview with Karam 
Zuhdi: Sabrin Shamardal, “Egypt: Former Islamic Group Amir Karam Zuhdi on Civil State, Copts, Violence,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat Online in 
Arabic, 17 October 2011. Interview with Najih Ibrahim: Ni’mat Majdi, “Egyptian Islamic Group Member Regrets Al-Sadat Assassination, 
Criticizes Mubarak,” in Al-Ra’y Online in Arabic, 25 October 2011; Suhayb Sharayir of Dubai Al-Arabiyah Television, “ Egyptian Experts 
Discuss ‘Jurisprudential Revisions’ in Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah,” 23 November 2012, in www.opensource.gov.; Najih Ibrahim, Untitled, in Al-
Misri Al-Yawm, “Egypt: Statement by Leading Islamic Group Figure Says No-Violence Initiative Strong,” 02 July 2007; Najih Ibrahim, “Egypt: 
Former Islamic Group Leader Condemns Attack on Army Unit in Sinai,” in Al-Misri al-Yawm in Arabic, 9 August 2012, p. 12, in 
www.opensource.gov.
[31] Following Western ethical theory, the $rst is in essence a sacralized deontological (duty-based) ethics rooted in the dignity of the human 
individual and also the essentially chivalrous roots of classical codes of military ethics that grant immunity to non-combatants; the second, a 
consequentialist ground based on the principle of maximizing social utility.
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 	   	   	  	  	       Volume 7, Issue 5
108	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   October 2013
[32] Several distinct shari’a violations were committed through AQ’s intentional use of civil aviation to conduct the 9/11 attack. See, Islam and 
the Laws of War [Al-Islam wa-tahdhib al-hurub]), in MEMRI #1301, “ Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya vs. Al-Qaeda,” 27 September 2006, p.3.
[33] e IG’s account of the contrast between the IG and AQ vis-a-vis the permissibility of targeting Muslims who are deemed ‘shields’ and 
being used by the enemy to gain military advantage is evidenced in a “Summary” posted by the IG of a nine-day long web-based dialogue/
discussion between the IG’s Shaykh Usamah Ibrahim Ha$z and AQ’s Walid Abd-al-Hamid al-Sharqawi al-Midhar al-Idrisi al-Alawi, who was 
assisted by Shaykh Ahmad Abd-al-Salam. (See, Jihadist Websites, “Discussion with Al-Qa’ida, Islamic Group Representatives Concludes, No 
Consensus,”29 August 2006, in www.opensource.gov.)
[34] Muhammad Salah, “Egypt: IG Outlines Reasons for Peace Initiative, Islamic Movements’ Future,” in Al-Hayah in Arabic , 2 February 
2002, p. 5.
[35] Ibid. See also: Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 181; Muhammad Salah, “Report Views Attempt to Rebuild Egypt’s Jihad 
Group, IG’s Change of Ideas,” Al-Wasat in Arabic, 11 February 2002, in www.opensource.gov. Muhammad Salah, “Egypt’s Islamic Group 
Spells Out ‘Controls’ and ‘Rules’ Governing Jihad,” in Al-Hayah (Intenet Version-WWW) in Arabic, 3 February 2002. Dr. Najih Ibrahim lists 
this as the very $rst principle of the Corrections when he states in his 2007 conference paper honouring the 10th anniversary of the 5 July 1997 
unilateral, unconditional cease$re: “First, we directed attention [in the Corrections] to the importance of looking into the interests, 
corruption, and what is known as the jurisprudence of results so that the youth do not become involved in a violent clash that would hurt it 
gravely as well as its religion and nation. Also, a young man should try to read his reality locally, regionally, and internationally so that his acts 
and behavior do not weaken his country and help its enemies to defeat it.” In, Al-Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic, “Egypt: Statement by Leading 
Islamic Group Figure Says No-Violence Initiative Strong,” 2 July 2007.
[36] e IG’s allegation that Bin Laden’s motivation was primarily one of personal vengeance is captured in the following exchange. Karam 
Zuhdi, aer clarifying that Rifa’i Taha le the IG one week before the 1998 East African embassy bombings, states: “One week aer his 
withdrawal, the two American embassies in Nairobi and Dar al-Salaam were bombed as if this was a trap for all groups to share the blame for 
the blows that Usama Bin Ladin wants to deal to the Americans.” Chief editor Makram Muhammad then asks, “Do you see any good in what 
Usama bin Ladin has done?,” to which Zuhdi replies, “I say there is a diﬀerence between emotions and Islamic and logical calculations.” - See: 
Makram Muhammad, “Egypt: Interview With Islamic Group Leaders on Recent Revision of eir Ideology.” Al-Musawwar in Arabic 21 June 
2002.
[37]Cited in, Makram Muhamad Ahmad “Correction: Islamic Group Leaders Tour Prisons with Non-Violence Message, Wholesale Release—
adding editorial notation,” in Arabic in al-Musawwaar, 28 June 2002.
[38] For the Corrected conception and practice regarding tak$r and also kufr al-nizam (unbelief of the regime), see summary in Peters, Jihad 
in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 181. Al-Sayyid’s brief outline (Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, “e Other Face of the Islamist Movement,” p. 
17) for summary of the IG’s 2002 Ban on Narrow Positions on Religion and on the Excommunication of Muslims (Hormat ab Gholw % al-Din 
wa Tak%r al-Muslimin); and also, Y. Carmon, Y. Felder, and D. Lav, “e Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological 
Reversal,” 22 December 2006, p. 10. e concept al-Hakimiyya and its importance in both initiating and then ceasing violent rebellion is 
extensively discussed in actual IG texts, interviews, and conference paper: Najih Ibrahim, Authority: Shari’a View and Realistic Vision (Al-
Hakimah: Nzrah Shar’iyah wa Ru’yah Wagi’iyah), serialized in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, and partially available in English translation via 
opensource.gov for 27 July 2005, 28 July 2005, 31 July 2005, 16 August 2005; see also excerpt in MEMRI, #1301, “Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya vs. 
Al-Qaeda,” 27 September 2006, p. 3.
[39]Najih Ibrahim, “Egypt: Former Islamic Group Leader Condemns Attack on Army Unit in Sinai,” Al-Misri al-Yawm in Arabic, 9 August 
2012.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Source: Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, “Part 1 of Book Review: Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qa’ida’s Strategy,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat 
(Internet Version-WWW) in Arabic 11 January 2004.
[42] Najih Ibrahim, title not given, in Al-Misri Al-Yawm, “Egypt: Statement by Leading Islamic Group Figure Says No-Violence Initiative 
Strong,” 2 July 2007.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Later in same interview Zuhdi similarly refers to the dangers if one is to “apply certain texts to the wrong reality.” See, Makrum 
Muhammad Ahmad, “Egypt: Interview with Islamic Group Leaders on Recent Revision of eir Ideology,” 21 June 2002.
[46] Usamah Ibrahim Ha$z and Asim Abd al-Magid Mohammed, e Initiative to Cease Violence: A Realistic Vision and a View Based on the 
Shari’a (Mibadarat waf al-‘unf: ru’ya wagi’iyya-wa-nazra shar’iyya), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002; in Muhammad Salah, “Egypt: 
IG Outlines Reasons for Peace Initiative, Islamic Movements’ Future,” Al-Hayah in Arabic,2 February 2002, p. 5. Usamah Ibrahim Ha$z and 
Asim Abd al-Magid Mohammed, e Initiative to Cease Violence: A Realistic Vision and a View Based on the Shari’a (Mibadarat waf al-‘unf: 
ru’ya wagi’iyya-wa-nazra shar’iyya), Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2002, in Ahmad Musa, “Egypt: Islamic Group Leaders Con$rm ‘No 
Violence Initiative,’” in Al-Ahram in Arabic, 9 February 2002. See also: “e diﬀerence between Al-Qa’ida’s vision and that of the Al-Jamah 
Al-Islamiyah surfaces on several levels: the level of understanding the provisions of the Shari’ah and their application to reality; the level of 
understanding reality and its challenges; and the level of arranging the priorities.” ( In, Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, “Part 1 of Book Review: 
Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qa’ida’s Strategy,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat (Internet Version-WWW) in Arabic 11 January 2004).
[47] Najih Ibrahim states in relation to these fatwa: “[W]e re-read some fatwas that were wrongly implanted in the past which led to great 
evils, such as the fatwa concerning the Tatars. We came up with a very important conclusion, notably that the contemporary armies of Islamic 
states are drastically diﬀerent from the Tatar armies. Consequently, the comparison is %awed.” Najih Ibrahim “Egypt: Statement by Leading 
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 	   	   	  	  	       Volume 7, Issue 5
109	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   October 2013
Islamic Group Figure Says No-Violence Initiative Strong,” 2 July 2007. Regarding the principle of Allah’s Absolute Sovereignty, Ibrahim states 
further in the same conference paper, “[W]e presented a view [on al-Hakimiyya] which was the product of much thought that we gave over 
the issue of governance over the past years and the presumed relationship between rulers and ruled in light of the teachings and principles of 
Islam. We said that one could not call a person a ka$r because he did not rule by God’s principles. However, a person becomes ka$r if he adds 
ingratitude to negligence, or preferred the rule of men to that of God. We also mentioned the importance of what could be called the trial of 
men, and proved that the rule of men did not have to clash with that of God the Almighty if it were in the right context de$ned for it by Islam. 
Both rules complemented each other. . ..” (p. 5).
[48] Abd-al-Latif al-Manawi, “Egyptian Islamic Group Leaders React to Abu-Hamza Al-Masri’s Criticism,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic; 4 
July 2003.
[49] Makram Muhamad Ahmad (Editor in Chief), “Correction: Islamic Group Leaders Tour Prisons with Non-Violence Message, Wholesale 
Release—adding editorial notation,” in Arabic in: al-Musawwaar, 28 June 2002.
[50] In, Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, “Part 1 of Book Review: Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qa’ida’s Strategy,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat (Internet 
Version-WWW); in Arabic 11 January 2004.
[51] See, e.g. Harry R. Yarger, Strategic eory for the 21st Century: e Little Book on Big Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, February 2006, esp. pp. 70-71.
[52] See, Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, “Part 1 of Book Review: Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qa’ida’s Strategy,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat (Internet 
Version-WWW) in Arabic 11 January 2004.
[53] See, Makram Muhamad Ahmad (Editor-in-Chief), “Correction: Islamic Group Leaders Tour Prisons with Non-Violence Message, 
Wholesale Release—adding editorial notation,” in Arabic; in: al-Musawwaar, 28 June 2002. Najih Ibrahim, in another interview would also 
summarize these consequences: “e [AQ] operations have achieved only ruin, destruction, and occupation for Islam and Muslims. ey 
have weakened the Islamic countries politically and economically. Afghanistan is just one of the negative repercussions of the 11 September 
attacks. For example, the [2003] bombings in Riyadh caused more damage to Saudi Arabia and Muslim countries in various $elds than they 
did to the United States and the West” (See, Muhammad Salah, “Egypt’s IG Ideologue Says al-Qa’ida’s Operations Bring Ruin, Weaken 
Muslims,” in Al-Hayah in Arabic 28 May 2003, in www.opensource.gov.
[54] See, Muhammad Nasr Karum, “Egyptian Islamists on Impact of Bin Ladin’s Killing,” in Al-Quds al-Arabi Online in Arabic 4 May 2011 
(orig. Arabic title englished: “Najih Ibrahim: Al-Qa’ida Will Not Be Able to Avenge Bin Laden Because of its Feebleness and Because its 
Leaders are in Hiding.”), in www.opensource.gov.
[55] See, R. Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, pp. 182-183.
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 	   	   	  	  	       Volume 7, Issue 5
110	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   October 2013
